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Towards Context-Specific Directors' Duties




The global financial crisis gives reason to revisit the debate
on directors’ duties in corporate law, mainly with regard to
the context of banks. This article explores the need, ration-
ale and the potential for the introduction of context-specific
directors’ duties and enforcement mechanisms in the bank-
ing sector in the Netherlands from a comparative perspec-
tive.
Chiefly, two legal strategies can be derived from the post-
crisis developments and calls for legal reforms for the need
and rationale to sharpen directors’ duties in the context of
the banking sector in order to meet societal demands. The
two strategies consist in shifting the scope of directors’
duties (i) towards clients’ interests and (ii) towards the pub-
lic interest.
Subsequently, this article explores the potential for context-
specific directors’ duties and accompanying enforcement
mechanisms. Firstly, it is argued that the current legal
framework allows for the judicial development -specific
approach. Secondly, such context-specific directors’ duties
should be enforced through public-enforcement mecha-
nisms to enhance the accountability of bank directors
towards the public interest but currently there are too much
barriers for implementation in practice.
In conclusion, this article argues that there is indeed a need,
rationale and potential for context-specific directors’ duties;
yet there are several major obstacles for the implementation
of accompanying public-enforcement mechanisms. As a
result, the introduction of context-specific directors’ duties
in the banking sector may as yet entail nothing more than
wishful thinking because it will merely end in toothless
ambitions if the lack of accompanying enforcement mecha-
nisms remains intact.
Keywords: banking sector, directors' duties, financial crisis,
context-specific doctrines, public enforcement
The goal of the private sector cannot be only profit; it
must also be to add value, create jobs, develop the new
ideas that drive an economy forward. Vested interests
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and arbitrage typically hinder the accountability princi-
ple. One has in mind the financial sector, which turned
out to be insufficiently accountable – to its clients, its
shareholders, and to society in general. As we all know,
the global economic crisis was, in many respects, a gover-
nance crisis originating in the financial sector.1
1 Introduction
1.1 Corporate Governance in the Banking Sector
The recent global financial crisis gives rise to a wide
reflection on the functioning of corporate governance2
in banks and other financial institutions.3 In hindsight,
it seems to have become clear that directors of financial
institutions failed to prudently govern and oversee the
management and business affairs of their companies
when they approved too risky strategies.4 It is also
argued that the crisis has revealed that the interests of
directors did not necessarily tie in with the long-term
interests of the financial institution they were managing
and that the interests of certain stakeholders, such as
depositors or employees, have not been sufficiently tak-
en into account.5 If these claims are deemed to be valid,
1. C. Lagarde, A New Global Economy for a New Generation, speech at
the World Economic Forum 2013 on 23 January 2013 in Davos, Swit-
zerland. See <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2013/012313
.htm> (last visited 14 Oct. 2013).
2. There is no univocal definition of the comprehensive phrase corporate
governance. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004
describe this concept in the following manner: ‘Corporate governance
involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its
board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance
also provides the structure through which the objectives of the compa-
ny are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring
performance are determined’. Corporate law and governance are highly
interrelated; corporate law sets the conditions for corporate gover-
nance.
3. See, e.g., European Commission (2010), Green Paper on corporate gov-
ernance in financial institutions and remuneration policies, COM (2010)
284 final.
4. Group of Thirty, Toward Effective Governance of Financial Institutions
(2012), at 5. See also A. Turner, The Turner Review: Regulatory
Response to the Global Banking Crisis (2009) (mentioning that the fail-
ure of banks to manage risks was one of the proximate causes of the
financial crisis).
5. European Commission (2010a), Corporate Governance in Financial
Institutions: Lessons to be drawn from the current financial crisis, best
practices, SEC(2010) 669, at 6.
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an urgent follow-up question is to what extent we can
hold directors accountable for such detrimental actions.
In order to evaluate the accountability of bank directors
in the aftermath of the financial crisis, it is essential to
recognize that banks differ from non-financial compa-
nies, mainly because of the crucial functions of financial
intermediation6 and central capital allocation7 they fulfil
for individuals and companies serving both the society
and the economy as a whole. This specific role emphasi-
zes the important position of a wide range of stakehold-
ers in the corporate governance of banks since failures of
banks and other financial institutions could have sys-
temic consequences affecting society as a whole.8 This
notion has risen prominently to the surface during the
recent financial crisis. As such, companies in the bank-
ing sector have a social function in the economy result-
ing in a dual responsibility, not only towards the compa-
ny and its shareholders but also to the society as a
whole. The crisis has revealed that when these responsi-
bilities conflict, directors should be cautious in making
trade-offs that might neglect the interest of the society.
1.2 Post-Crisis Measures for Reforms in
Corporate Governance
In recognition of the particular function of banks and
other financial institutions, context-specific corporate
governance practices have been developed in the finan-
cial sector. In the post-crisis era, this development has
experienced a mushroom growth by means of a rapidly
increasing number of domestic self-regulatory corporate
governance codes for the financial sector, i.e. banks and
other financial institutions, in various countries world-
wide9 aiming to provide principles for responsible con-
duct. Many of these codes are based on international
standards established by the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision setting out expectations of banking
supervisors in relation to the minimum standards for
corporate governance of their licensees. These codes
6. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Enhancing Corporate Gover-
nance for Banking Organisations (2006), at 1.
7. C.M. Bruner, ‘Conceptions of Corporate Purpose in Post-Crisis Financial
Firms’, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev., at 527 (2013); R. Levine (2004), The Cor-
porate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of Concepts and
Evidence, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3404, availa-
ble at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=625281> (last visited 14 Oct.
2013).
8. OECD (2009), Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Find-
ings and Main Messages.
9. See, e.g., Central Bank of Jordan (2007), Corporate Governance Code
for Banks in Jordan, Qatar Central Bank (2008), Corporate Governance
Guidelines for Banks and Financial Institutions, Dutch Banking Associa-
tion (2009) The Banking Code, Walker Committee (2009), A Review of
Corporate Governance in UK banks and other financial industry enti-
ties, Association of the Luxembourg Fund Industry (2009), ALFI Code
of Conduct for Luxembourg Investment Funds, Association of Banks of
Georgia (2009), Corporate Governance Code for Commercial Banks,
Central Bank of Ireland (2010), Corporate Governance Code for Credit
Institutions and Insurance Undertakings, Monetary Authority of Singa-
pore (2010), Guidelines on corporate governance for banks, financial
holding companies and direct insurers which are incorporated in Singa-
pore, Guernsey Financial Services Commission (2011), Finance sector
code of corporate governance, The Clearing House Association (2012),
Guiding Principles for Banking Organization Corporate Governance,
Central Bank of Barbados (2013), Corporate Governance Guideline.
contain best practices and detailed recommendations
that may be used as guidelines for banks and other
financial institutions to arrange their corporate gover-
nance practices. The main benefit of such codes is that
they provide directors with guidance on their corporate
governance structures without the downside risk of
actual personal legal liability. It remains questionable,
however, whether we can rely on self-regulation to solve
the crisis regarding corporate governance in the finan-
cial sector.
Besides self-regulatory codes of corporate governance
(soft law) for banks and other financial institutions, an
important subject of discussion remains whether
reforms to directors’ duties in the corporate legal frame-
work may be useful to align the accountability of direc-
tors of banks with their dual role towards shareholders
and the society effectively.10 In the Netherlands, this
discussion would be mostly concerned with the inter-
pretation and enforcement of the directors’ duty to pro-
tect the interests of the company in the specific context
of banks. The general directors’ duty to protect the
interests of the company and the interests of those
involved is implemented in Dutch statutory corporate
law. Legal provisions stipulate directors to act in the
interest of the company and its affiliated enterprise in
Section 2:129, paragraph 5 (public companies) and Sec-
tion 2:239, paragraph 5 (closed companies) of the Dutch
Civil Code. Does this general duty suffice to provide an
effective enforcement mechanism to hold bank directors
accountable in the aftermath of the financial crisis? If so,
are bank directors actually held accountable? If not, are
there perhaps alternatives to align the accountability of
bank directors with the needs of the society?
1.3 Outline
This article explores the need and rationale as well as
the potential for the introduction of specific directors’
duties with accompanying enforcement mechanisms in
the context of the banking sector. I aim to put forward
the notion that context-specific duties in the banking
sector would fit in with the practice of post-crisis devel-
opments as well as the judicial development of context-
specific sub-doctrines to open-textured directors’
duties. Subsequently, I question whether such context-
specific directors’ duties can be accompanied with pub-
lic-enforcement mechanisms in order to ensure possibil-
ities for the public to hold bank directors accountable.
Firstly, before delving further into the feasibility of con-
text-specific directors’ duties for the banking sector, a
short background is provided of the current Dutch cor-
porate law system with regard to the general directors’
duty to act in the interest of the corporation and its
10. See, e.g., R. Anderson (2009), Risk Management & Corporate Gover-
nance (report prepared for the OECD), at 24-25, 37, with a recommen-
dation to the OECD that in the case of organisations that have a broad
societal impact and who therefore owe a duty of care to society at
large, directors should owe a new legal duty to discharge their corpo-
rate governance responsibilities with due and diligent care, in order to
enforce a change of culture in the banking industry as this is an industry
that contributes significantly to the proper functioning of the economic
system.
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affiliated enterprise as an open-textured legal concept
(Section 2). This general directors’ duty is concerned
with the key obligation for directors to balance the inter-
ests of various corporate stakeholders while discharging
directors’ responsibilities. Secondly, the need and
rationale for implementing a sector-specific approach in
the context of banks and other financial institutions will
be considered (Section 3) by providing a comparative
analysis of post-crisis proposals for legal reforms in the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Europe, which
suggest to shift the scope of directors’ duties to clients’
interests and by examining post-crisis developments
highlighting the particular nature of corporate gover-
nance in the banking sector arising from the social func-
tion of banks, which suggest to shift the scope of direc-
tors’ duties to the public interest. Thirdly, the potential
for context-specific directors’ duties will be explored
(Section 4) by examining the process of the judicial cre-
ation of context-specific directors’ duties as sub-doc-
trines to general directors’ duties. Fourthly, the poten-
tial for the introduction of accompanying public-
enforcement mechanisms in the form of criminal liabili-
ty will be explored (Section 5) to enhance the accounta-
bility of directors to sector-specific directors’ duties. In
conclusion, a summary is provided of the main findings
of this article.
1.4 Limitations
Potential changes to the interpretation and enforcement
of directors’ duties are merely one aspect of reforming
the corporate governance of banks. This aspect cannot
be viewed isolated from other proposed measures to
tackle the past failures in the financial sector. Although
not the main focus of this article, it is worthwhile to
mention these other proposals briefly as they would
inevitably have an impact on the wider corporate gover-
nance system and as such are very much interrelated to
the functioning of directors’ duties. Other measures and
policy recommendations for reforms in the corporate
governance of banks include – inter alia – proposals to
curb excessive board remuneration and compensation
packages, to align the performance standards of senior
executives with the bank’s long-term objectives and
strategy11 in order to discourage excessive short-term
risk-taking, to include stakeholders such as a regulator
and debt holders in the board structure,12 to educate
independent board members in the operational details
and complex products of financial institutions,13 or to
change the organisational structure of banks and reallo-
cate risks by means of ‘ring-fencing’ banks, i.e. legally
separating certain risky assets from retail banking opera-
tions.
11. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010a), Principles for
Enhancing Corporate Governance, Basel: BIS 2010, at 9, available at:
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs176.pdf> (last visited 14 Oct. 2013).
12. V.V. Acharya, J.N. Carpenter, X. Gabaix, X., et al., Corporate Gover-
nance in the Modern Financial Sector, in V. Acharya, and M. Richard-
son (eds.), Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System
(2009), at 185-196.
13. Id.
Furthermore, the effects of legislative measures are
limited from a behavioural point of view as this perspec-
tive propagates that not all behaviour can be captured by
regulation.14 Extra-legal and non-quantifiable forces
such as moral values and culture play an important role
in shaping the behavioural patterns of directors because
they ‘drive people to do the right thing even when no
one is looking’.15 The Dutch Central Bank (DNB) has
discerned the importance of behaviour and culture in
financial institutions and stated that there is a lack of
clear consideration of various stakeholders’ interests
within the financial sector.16 The DNB mentions the
balancing of interests as one of the seven elements that
lead the way to a culture of integrity. Although it is rec-
ognized that such extra-legal indicators play an impor-
tant role to create a culture of legal compliance, this arti-
cle is limited to the view from law and will not delve
further into the behavioural perspective.
2 General Directors’ Duties:
An Open-Textured Legal
Concept
2.1 The Open Texture of General Directors’
Duties
General directors’ duties have an open-textured charac-
ter in both common law and civil law jurisdictions.
Directors’ duties in English common law countries are
based on a fiduciary relationship resulting in fiduciary
directors’ duties covering a legal relationship of trust
and confidence. Fiduciary standards traditionally stem
from the English legal system where they are viewed as
the mainstay of the relationship between directors and
the company and its shareholders. Fiduciary directors’
duties aim to settle the tensions that come with the sepa-
ration of control and ownership in companies, arising
from the delegation of control to directors and the resid-
ual ownership of shareholders.17 These duties are regar-
ded to be an important legal protection device with a
primary – not a sole – responsibility towards sharehold-
ers when conflicts of interests between directors and the
company arise. In the Netherlands, statutory law engag-
es in setting legal standards of conduct for directors.
These statutory directors’ duties – alike their common
law counterparts – arouse legal uncertainty because they
are to be characterized as open-textured legal standards
14. See, e.g., R. Tomasic, ‘Beyond “Light Touch” Regulation of British
banks after the Financial Crisis’ in I. MacNeil and P.J. O’Brien (eds.), The
Future of Financial Regulation (2010), at 103-122, 103 (mentioning
the power of market euphoria and perverse incentives as behavioural
factors).
15. Group of Thirty (2012), above n. 4, at 15.
16. DNB (2009). De 7 Elementen van een Integere Cultuur: Beleidsvisie en
aanpak gedrag en cultuur bij financiële ondernemingen 2010-2014
(The 7 Elements of a Sound Culture: Policy Outlook and Tackling
Behavior and Culture at Financial Enterprises), November 2009.
17. M.M. Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance
for the Twenty-First Century (1995), at 56.
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of conduct, which are essentially context-dependent in
most cases.
Dutch corporate law mainly recognizes two general
directors’ duties in the form of open-textured standards
of conduct. These directors’ duties are codified in Sec-
tion 2:8 Dutch Civil Code (duty to act in reasonableness
and fairness) and Section 2:9 Dutch Civil Code (duty of
proper performance) for companies. Additionally, Section
2:129, paragraph 5 Dutch Civil Code (for public compa-
nies) and Section 2:239, paragraph 5 Dutch Civil Code
(for private companies) describes how directors are
regarded to act in the interest of the company and its affili-
ated enterprise in the fulfilment of their duties. This duty
might provide more clarification on the corporate objec-
tives and the scope of beneficiaries to be taken into
account when directors fulfil their directors’ duties.
Section 2:8 Dutch Civil Code is at the heart of Dutch
corporate law dealing with the internal affairs of the
company. This provision provides that every legal per-
son such as a company, and those involved with its
organisation by statutory law and articles of association,
have a duty to act in reasonableness and fairness towards
each other.18 Furthermore, the standard provides that
the terms of reasonableness and fairness may require
looking beyond the law, common practice, bylaws, regu-
lations, or resolutions, when considering the circum-
stances of the case.19 The wide span of the term reasona-
bleness and fairness envelops a comprehensive legal con-
cept. This notion includes the consideration of generally
prevailing legal conceptions in the Netherlands20 as well
as the social and personal interests involved in the given
situation.21 This standard requires of the company and
those involved to exercise care in their conduct, which
implies that in defending their own interests each party
should at all times be co-guided by the legitimate inter-
ests of others in the company and after this considera-
tion should spare them if their interests would be dis-
proportionally harmed.22 The effectuation of this duty
of care varies depending on the circumstances of the
case.
According to Section 2:9 Dutch Civil Code, every direc-
tor owes a duty of proper performance to the company.
There is not a single and clear definition of the term
proper performance. Similar to Section 2:8 Dutch Civil
Code, this is an open-textured standard. Directors rely
on case law to gain clarity on the interpretation of this
standard.
18. Sec. 2:8, para. 1 Dutch Civil Code.
19. Sec. 2:8, para. 2 Dutch Civil Code.
20. E.g., the best practices of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, see
Dutch Supreme Court 9 July 2010, NJ 2010, 544 (ASMI).
21. Sec. 3:12 Dutch Civil Code, Dutch Supreme Court 1 March 2002, NJ
2002, 296 (Zwagerman Beheer).
22. More in general, this standard emphasizes the co-dependency of those
involved with the company, thereby coinciding with a mode of life:
‘[s]omehow we’re caught in an inescapable network of mutuality tied in
a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly affects all
indirectly. (…) This is the interrelated structure of reality’. M.L. King Jr.,
Dr. Martin Luther King’s 1963 WMU Speech Found (1963), 18 Decem-
ber 1963, available at: <http://www.wmich.edu/~ulib/archives/mlk/
transcription.html> (last visited 14 Oct. 2013).
2.2 The Duty to Act in the Interest of the
Company and Its Affiliated Enterprise
Whilst discharging their general duties, directors are
required by statutory law to take into account the duty
to act in the interest of the company and its affiliated
enterprise.23 Neither courts nor legal scholars have as
yet indicated a uniform definition of what constitutes
the interest of the company.24 I argue that the substantive
interpretation of this open-textured duty can be defined
further dynamically in various situations and circum-
stances by (1) viewing which corporate objective is to be
pursued by directors in the given context, while (2)
specifying which corporate stakeholders are to be regar-
ded as beneficiaries with regard to that corporate objec-
tive.
The currently prevailing notion regarding the substan-
tive meaning of this duty merely recognizes an all-
embracing responsibility for directors to take a non-
specified wide range of stakeholders’ interests (benefi-
ciaries) into account for the continuity of the company
(corporate objective) in the fulfilment of their duties.
This notion does not pursue the context-sensitivity of
the duty in greater depth and as such the contents of
this duty remain to be rather hollow and static. The one
thing that might be clearly derived from this interpreta-
tion is that this directors’ duty is not primarily geared
towards the interests of shareholders but has a pluralist
basis requiring directors to act in the interests of a wide
range of stakeholders as beneficiaries.25 Yet more
recently, even the scope of this heterogeneous model
seems to have become uncertain now heading in favour
of a prevailing monolithic pursuit of long-term share-
holder value with an increased focus on shareholders’
interests.26 The shifting paradigm is expressed in the
revised Dutch Corporate Governance Code 2008 for lis-
ted public companies, where it is stated that
The Code is based on the principle accepted in the
Netherlands that a company is a long-term alliance
between the various parties involved in the company.
The stakeholders are the groups and individuals who,
23. Sec. 2:129, para. 5 (public companies) and Sec. 2:139, para. 5 (private
companies) of the Dutch Civil Code. Prior to the implementation of this
legal provision, Dutch corporate case law recognized this notion in the
cases Dutch Supreme Court 1 April 1949, NJ 1949, at 465 (Doetin-
chemse IJzergieterij) and Dutch Supreme Court 4 January 1963, NJ
1964, at 434 (Scholten’s Aardappelmeelfabrieken), where it was deci-
ded that the directors were allowed to issue shares against the wish of
shareholders if this action served the interest of the company.
24. B.F. Assink, De Januskop van het ondernemingsrecht: over faciliëring
en regulering van het ondernemerschap (2010) (The Double-Faced
Head of Corporate Law: On Facilitation and Regulation of Entrepre-
neurship), (inaugural lecture Rotterdam), at 36 et seq.
25. Timmerman mentions that the plurality of interests pursued and weigh-
ed against each other in a company by directors is one of the prevailing
principles of Dutch company law, see L. Timmerman, ‘Principles of Pre-
vailing Dutch Company Law’, 11 European Business Organization Law
Review (EBOR) 4, at 609-627 (2010), also available at SSRN: <http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1503943> (last visited 14 Oct. 2013).
26. See also L. Timmerman (2010) (defending the approach of ‘enlightened
shareholder value’ similar to Sec. 172 UK Companies Act 2006 where
principally the long term interests of shareholders prevail while other
stakeholders’ interests may also be taken into account when these inter-
ests are likely to be neglected disproportionally).
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directly or indirectly, influence – or are influenced
by – the attainment of the company’s objects: i.e.
employees, shareholders and other lenders, suppliers,
customers, the public sector and civil society. The
management board and the supervisory board have
overall responsibility for weighing up these interests,
generally with a view to ensuring the continuity of
the enterprise, while the company endeavours to cre-
ate long-term shareholder value.27
From this definition, it becomes clear that the twin cor-
porate objectives of continuity along with long-term
shareholder value are to be pursued by directors while at
the same time having regard to a wide range of other
stakeholders’ interests.28 The validity of ‘long-term
shareholder value’ as a corporate objective for the inter-
pretation of this duty has as yet not been explicitly veri-
fied by courts.
Pursuing this question in greater depth, long-term
shareholder value seems to be a more univalent objective
for directors to pursue as the stress predominantly falls
on one stakeholder group – i.e. the shareholder body –
when speaking of shareholder value. In practice, this
provides directors a single valued metric thereby pre-
venting a deadlock regarding the trade-off between the
interests of various stakeholders in decision-making pro-
cedures. Yet the notion of shareholder value viewed
apart is not as uniform as it may seem at first glance.
The underlying interests of the shareholder body of
large public companies with a dispersed ownership
structure may be divided by various individual share-
holders with conflicting underlying goals.29
Moreover, attempting to define and carry out the long-
term perspective remains an ambiguous and impractica-
ble task for directors because of various reasons: (1) Sev-
eral commentators agree that companies should be man-
aged for the long term,30 but it is rather unclear how to
make a distinction between the consequences for the
short term on the one hand and the long-term on the
other hand while pursuing certain major business trans-
actions. The law does not draw a sharp line with regard
to the time horizon of corporate objectives. (2) In prac-
tice, directors may be inclined to make decisions –
accommodated by discretionary powers – with a visible
27. Dutch Corporate Governance Code 2008, Preamble, No. 7.
28. In comparison with the UK, this definition is in line with the general
directors’ duty to promote the success of the company as formulated in
Sec. 172 UK Companies Act 2006.
29. See, e.g., I. Anabtawi & L. Stout, ‘Fiduciary Duties for Activist Share-
holders’, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 5, at 1255, 1287 (2008); J.E. Fisch, ‘Measur-
ing Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy’, 31 J.
Corp. L., at 637 (2006). This view has more recently been contested by
G.W. Dent, Jr., ‘The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of
Investor Short-Termism’, 35 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, at 97 (2010).
30. See, e.g., L.E. Strine, Jr., ‘One Fundamental Corporate Governance
Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term
Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?’, 66
Business Lawyer 4, at 3 (2010); See also A. Rappaport, ‘Ten Ways to
Create Shareholder Value’, 84 Harvard Business Review 9, at 66-76
(2006) (arguing that acquisitions should be made that maximize expec-
ted value even at the expense of lowering near-term earnings, and that
directors should be rewarded for delivering superior long-term returns).
impact on the short term due to pressures from share-
holders31 to deliver high share prices and dividends and
peer pressure from competitors in financial markets as
well as executive remuneration and compensation
schemes32 linked to current profitability. (3) The strat-
egy of long-term decision making remains to have its
weaknesses as it does not necessarily guarantee more
beneficial results for the performance of the company
than the short-term horizon. In essence, bad decisions
come from bad ideas33 or bad motives – e.g. opportunis-
tic behaviour during conflicts of interests – irrespective
of their time horizon. The time horizon merely indicates
the time span of the consequences of good or bad deci-
sions. For example, imagine the worst case scenario
where a defective long-term perspective results in disas-
trous ex post long-term financial consequences because
of poor ex ante long-term business strategies.34
Short-term objectives enable the pursuit of long-term
goals. Directors continuously need to balance such
interim short-term objectives with strategic long-term
goals35 because both carry risks that are interwoven.
With every decision, directors are confronted with the
dilemma to not let short-termism prevail at the expense
of long-termism and vice versa. Therefore, it is ques-
tionable whether there is a need to include the long-
term perspective explicitly when defining the directors’
duty to act in the interest of the company while short-
term dynamics also play an important role in practice.
The indeterminate legal underpinnings of the Dutch
stakeholder model are also subject to criticism from
directors. Even before the financial crisis, former DSM
board director Peter Elverding had been quoted saying
that the Dutch principle of stakeholderism can be defined
as a form of hypocrisy.36 Elverding believed the hypoc-
risy lied in the fact that directors are required to consid-
er a wide range of interests according to the law while
they are not able to voice the value of these interests. He
stated that, on that account, the view to always express
all values in the form of money dominates in practice. It
seems that the essence of Elverding’s argument comes
down to the fact that non-financial interests are difficult
to deal with as they cannot be quantified whereas share-
holders’ interests might be more easily translated into
the quantifiable factor of shareholder value. Indeed, it
may not seem feasible for directors to obey the legal
directors’ duty to act in the interest of the company and
its affiliated enterprise as they cannot assess the values
31. Strine (2010), above n. 30; De la Rosière (2009), Report on the future
of financial supervision in the EU, 25 February 2009, at 10.
32. R.S. Thomas & J.G. Hill (eds.), Research Handbook on Executive Pay
(2012), at 232-233; Rosière (2009), above n. 31, at 10, 30-31.
33. See J. Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-term Deci-
sion Making (2012), at 10.
34. See, e.g., Knowledge@Wharton, What’s Wrong with This Picture:
Kodak’s 30-year Slide into Bankruptcy, available at: <http://knowledge
.wharton .upenn .edu/ article .cfm ?articleid= 2935> (last visited 14 Oct.
2013) (describing Kodak’s downfall resulting from a failure to adapt its
long-term business strategy to the innovative technological changes in
modern times).
35. A. Keay, The Corporate Objective (2011), at 53-54.
36. S.M. Bartman (2007), De verweesde onderneming (The Orphaned
Enterprise), Ondernemingsrecht, at 316-319 (2007-2008).
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of a wide range of stakeholders’ interests in practice.37
Additionally, because directors remain to have wide dis-
cretionary powers, the influences of extra-legal indica-
tors and internal pressures such as corporate culture and
shareholder power are also reinforced and may result in
directors departing from the stakeholder model. Conse-
quently, an ineluctable gap between the theory and
practice of the Dutch stakeholder model continues to
exist.
2.3 Towards a Specification of Open-Textured
Directors’ Duties
The main drawback of existing directors’ duties seems
to be that they are perceived as isles of law girt with
contingencies in theory and practice because of their
open-textured formulation. These duties have evolved
into somewhat nebulous legal formulas with an indica-
tive character merely setting out minimum require-
ments for directors. Yet the capacious language of these
duties can be justified by the fact that they are designed
to cover various circumstances as directors have a broad
responsibility to manage the overall business and affairs
of the company. Against this background, legal direc-
tors’ duties merely serve as a safety net to accommodate
and secure general precepts rather than to enclose all
potential particularities within a cobweb of detailed
commandments to span all-embracing rules in which
directors might become entangled.
The question then is why the various situations and cir-
cumstances that are covered by the open-textured direc-
tors’ duties are not elaborated upon doctrinally to dis-
mantle the ambiguity. By doing so, we may come up
with a variety of consistent and coherent interpretations
of directors’ duties tailored to various contexts. The
current lack of recognition of context-specific directors’
duties on a doctrinal basis sustains the ambiguity of
these legal standards of conduct and hinders a more
substantive formulation of the contents of directors’
duties. Such legal uncertainty also results in poor
enforcement mechanisms which on their turn eventually
effectuate deficiencies in directors’ accountability. Con-
sequently, the next paragraphs view the question wheth-
er there is a need and rationale (Section 3) as well as a
potential (Section 4) to specify the contents of directors’
duties in the context of banks aligned with enforcement
mechanisms (Section 5) in order to enhance the
accountability of directors in the banking sector.
37. Other factors, such as the reputation and the perception of individual
performance of directors may also cause directors to operate the enter-
prise in a manner that maximizes financial performance indicators,
including shareholder returns, see C. M. Daily, D. R. Dalton & A. A.
Cannella Jr, ‘Corporate Governance: Decades of Dialogue and Data’, 28
Academy of Management Review 3, at 371-382, 373 (2003).
3 The Need and Rationale for
Context-Specific Directors’
Duties in the Banking Sector
In the post-crisis developments and calls for legal
reform, chiefly two legal strategies come to the fore-
front, both entailing a proposition to shift the scope of
the contents of the directors’ duties in the banking sec-
tor. The first strategy zooms in on the protection of the
clients’ interests in their capacity of key stakeholders in
the banking sector recognizing that directors have duties
towards those for whom they hold funds in trust,
besides shareholders. The second strategy is concerned
with expanding the focus of directors’ duties in the
banking sector towards the public interest. When taking
these strategies into account, directors of companies in
the banking sector would be subject to stricter legal
duties in comparison to directors of non-financial com-
panies. Thus, these reform strategies can be regarded as
proposals, which factually attempt to flesh out sector-
specific directors’ duties in the context of the banking
sector. Firstly, this paragraph provides a comparative
review of the post-crisis proposals for reform aimed
towards context-specific directors’ duties towards cli-
ents’ interests in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom
and on a European level. Secondly, the social function
of banks will be scrutinized to view the need and ration-
ale for shifting the scope of directors’ duties in the bank-
ing sector towards the public interest.
3.1 Post-Crisis Calls for Legal Reforms: Shifting
the Scope Towards Clients’ Interests
In several countries, there have been calls for legal
reform of directors’ duties towards clients’ interests – in
their capacity of key stakeholders – in the aftermath of
the financial crisis. In the followings sub-paragraphs, I
provide a comparative analysis of the various proposals
for reform to assess the various arguments pro and con
of such a shift.
3.1.1 The Netherlands
As a direct consequence of the financial crisis, there has
been specific attention for reforms in the corporate gov-
ernance of banks in the Netherlands. Areas for reform
have been brought in the limelight by the Dutch Central
Bank and the Advisory Committee of the Future of
Banks in the Netherlands38 both stressing the point that
the strategy of financial institutions has to be redefined
into one where the focus is once again on customers and
where the institution is independent of its market value.
It is mentioned that the focus on clients’ interests will at
the same time benefit the interests of other stakeholders
such as employees and shareholders. Tangible solutions
in alliance with banks are pursued in the semi-legal
environment with the implementation of best practices
38. Advisory Committee on the Future of Banks in the Netherlands (2009).
Restoring trust, 7 April 2009, at 2.
98
ELR November 2013 | No. 2
in newly introduced sector-specific corporate gover-
nance codes.
In April 2009, the Advisory Committee on the Future of
Banks issued the report Restoring Trust to come up with
recommendations for the future of governance in the
banking sector. Consequently, the Netherlands’ Bankers
Association published the Banking Code (Code Banken)
in September 2009; a corporate governance code for
banks.39 The Banking Code has to be read in concert
with the full set of national, European and international
laws, regulations, codes and jurisprudence. This code
has a self-regulatory character to a certain degree as it is
based on the comply-or-explain principle. The comply-
or-explain principle requires banks to include a state-
ment in their annual report clarifying to what extent
they have acted in compliance with the principles and to
provide an explanation when a principle is not applied.
The Banking Code came into force on 1 January 2010.
The code encompasses a specific duty of care towards
clients. This notion is laid down more specific in para-
graphs 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 of the Banking Code both men-
tioning obligations of stakeholder consideration for bank
directors in their tasks and working methods.
Paragraph 3.2.1 of the Banking Code postulates that the
bank’s executive board shall ensure that it carefully con-
siders the interests of all of the parties involved in the
bank, such as the bank’s clients, its shareholders and its
employees, in all of its actions. These considerations
shall take into account the continuity of the bank, the
environment and society in which the bank operates as
well as legislation, regulations and codes that apply to
the bank. Paragraph 3.2.2 of the Banking Code states
that maintaining a continued focus on its clients’ inter-
ests is a necessary precondition for the continuity of the
bank. Clients should in any case be treated with due care
and directors should see to it that the duty of care for
the client is embedded in the bank’s culture.
In December 2010, the Dutch Association of Insurers
followed suit in a similar manner by publishing its Gov-
ernance Principles based on the Banking Code. The
Governance Principles took effect on 1 January 2011 on
a similar comply-or-explain basis.40 It is stated that an
insurers’ board of directors has a responsibility for the
balanced trade-off of interests of all parties involved
with the insurer such as its clients, shareholders and
employees. In doing so, the continuity of the insurance
company, the social environment in which the insurance
company operates and the applicable laws, rules and
codes have to be taken into consideration.41 Moreover,
clients should be treated with care at all times.
39. The Code is available at: <http://www.nvb.nl/scrivo/asset.php?
id=534018> (last visited 24 June 2012). The Banking Code applies to all
activities performed by banks in possession of a banking license granted
under the Financial Supervisory Act (Wft). The Banking Code includes
principles complementary to the Dutch Corporate Governance Code of
December 2008 applied by listed banks and often applied by non-listed
banks on a voluntary basis.
40. The Governance Principles apply to all activities performed by insurance
companies in possession of a license granted under the Financial Super-
visory Act (Wft).
41. Para. 3.2.1 Governance Principles.
The legal impact of reforms through the Banking Code
In general, best practices are to be considered by direc-
tors in the form of extra-legal standards of conduct to
foster aspirational ideals for good corporate governance.
The main advantages of corporate governance codes
enshrined with such best practices are that they are
more flexible than statutory laws, they are often
designed in extensive consultation with the business
sector guided by the sector’s expertise, and they upkeep
the discretionary powers of directors. Yet at the same
time, a major disadvantage of these codes may be
implicit in the latter argument: companies are able to
design their own standards of conduct without directors
being subject to an external accountability mechanism.
In the Netherlands, this issue has been resolved to cer-
tain extent as it is accepted that the Dutch Corporate
Governance Code with its best practices may be taken
into account by courts for the interpretation of legal
directors’ duties.42 Thus, courts have to certain extent
strengthened the legal enforcement of best practices in
this code. It is arguable that other corporate governance
codes such as the Banking Code might also be interpre-
ted in this manner and that its sector-specific best prac-
tices may be legally reinforced despite a lack of legal
implementation.
3.1.2 The United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, Sir David Walker chaired a
post-crisis review of corporate governance in the bank-
ing industry – commissioned by the UK government –
resulting in recommendations in the 2009 Walker
Review.43 One of the criteria given priority in the Walk-
er Review was the development of proposals for best
practice, which would add value over time to the benefit
of shareholders, other stakeholders and for society more
widely.44 During the consultation phase, there had been
made suggestions to broaden directors’ duties within
banks and financial institutions to take the interests of a
wide range of stakeholders into account more explicitly
within the decision-making procedure. However, the
Walker Review concluded this would bring no advant-
age, yet rather potentially negative consequences. The
rationale behind the negative outcome to the proposal
for an extended duty is that conflicts between share-
holders’ interests and stakeholders’ interests are often
complex and already recognized within the current UK
regulatory framework.
In the United Kingdom, the law provides that directors
have the duty to promote the success of the company.45
42. Dutch Supreme Court 9 July 2010, NJ 2010, 544 (ASMI). See also A.F.
Verdam, ‘De zorgplicht van de bestuurder van een rechtspersoon’ (The
Duty of Care of a Corporate Director), 18 Onderneming & Financiering
2, at 105 (2010). NB: The Dutch Corporate Governance Code only
applies to listed companies.
43. Walker Review (2009), A review of corporate governance in UK banks
and other financial institutions: final recommendations, available at:
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treas-
ury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf> (last visited 14 June 2012).
44. Para. 1.25 Walker Review.
45. Sec. 172 UK Companies Act 2006.
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The scope of this directors’ duty recognizes sharehold-
ers’ interests in a more clean-cut manner as the UK
government has explicitly stated this duty represents the
enlightened shareholder value principle during the major
revision of the UK Companies Act in 2006. In the UK
government White Paper ahead of the major company
law reform, it was concluded,
The statement of duties will be drafted in a way
which reflects modern business needs and wider
expectations of responsible business behaviour. The
CLR (Company Law Review, WK) proposed that the
basic goal for directors should be the success of the
company for the benefit of its members as a whole;
but that, to reach this goal, directors would need to
take a properly balanced view of the implications of
decisions over time and foster effective relationships
with employees, customers and suppliers, and in the
community more widely. The Government strongly
agrees that this approach, which the CLR called
‘enlightened shareholder value’, is most likely to
drive long-term company performance and maximise
overall competitiveness and wealth and welfare for
all.46
Similar to the Dutch approach, this duty to act for the
success of the company encompasses stakeholders’
interests. Yet the consideration of stakeholders’ interests
is regarded as the justified means to ultimately obtain
the objective of the success of the company for the bene-
fit of the shareholder body.
The Walker Review comments that diluting the primacy
of the duty of directors of bank and other financial insti-
tutions to shareholders in order to accommodate a new
accountability to other stakeholders would risk changing
the contractual and legal basis on which the UK market
economy operates fundamentally. Moreover, it would
introduce potentially substantial new uncertainty for
shareholders as to the value of their holdings and would
be likely to lead to shareholder exodus from the sector
and a rise in the cost of capital for banks and other
financial institutions.47
In summary, above-mentioned post-crisis proposals for
legal reform have developed differently in both coun-
tries. In the United Kingdom, the possibility of sector-
specific directors’ duties in the context of banks and
other financial institutions has been explored but rejec-
ted as the reform may have consequences to the detri-
ment of shareholders’ interests. In the Netherlands,
reforms for context-specific directors’ duties in the
banking sector include a greater emphasis towards cli-
ents’ interests and thus the contents of the standards of
conduct are expanded and more specified for directors
of banks as opposed to other types of companies.
Although the Dutch solution has a semi-legal character
based on a self-regulatory corporate governance code
with attention to the implications of extra-legal indica-
46. UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Company Law Reform Bill
– White Paper, DTI: London 2005, at 20-21.
47. Walker Review (2009), above n. 43, at 137.
tors, it can be argued that its best practices may be rein-
forced in courts.
3.1.3 Europe
In June 2010, the European Commission adopted a
green paper launching a public consultation on ways to
improve corporate governance mechanisms in financial
institutions in order to prevent future crises.48 Among
other topics, the question was raised whether there is a
need for creation of a specific duty – ‘duty of care’ – to
be established for the board of directors. This duty
would then require directors of financial institutions to
take the interests of depositors and other stakeholders
into account during the decision-making procedure.49
Subsequently, this duty would help encourage the board
of directors to adopt less risky strategies and improve
the quality of the financial institution’s long-term risk
management. The green paper did mention the fact that
this idea might be hard to realize as there exist diverging
legal frameworks in Europe that would have to be exam-
ined and adapted in order to take away limitations. On
the other hand, similar provisions with obligations
regarding conduct towards clients already exist within
the EU regulatory framework on the level of certain
financial institutions. For example, an investment firm
situated in one of the EU Member States already has a
duty within to ‘act honestly, fairly, and professionally in
accordance with the best interests of its clients’50 when
providing investment services.
Responses to the proposal
In response to this consultation, a large majority of the
respondents stated that they would not favour the crea-
tion of a specific duty of care with regard to specific
stakeholders because they considered the primary fidu-
ciary duty of directors to be to their shareholders.51 The
range of objections towards the new duty – coming from
a large number of organisations sceptical about the
introduction of the proposed ‘duty of care’ into Europe-
an legislation – widely differed predominantly according
to the following arguments:
a. Directors have a priority to their shareholders.
Directors represent the interests of the shareholder
body and the interests of depositors and policy holders,
respectively, should not be singled out specifically
beyond having regard to the interests of the financial
institution itself and the ones of all other stakeholders.
The role of directors and regulators needs to be clearly
defined in that there should be a clear distinction
between the role of directors achieving corporate suc-
cess and regulators protecting public interest. Directors
48. European Commission (2010), above n. 3.
49. P.O. Mülbert, ‘Corporate Governance of Banks’, 10 European Business
Organization Law Review 3, at 411-436, 434 (2009).
50. Art. 19 Directive 2004/39/EC.
51. The responses of individuals, public authorities and registered organisa-
tions I have consulted as sources for this analysis are all available at:
<https:// circabc .europa .eu/ faces/ jsp/ extension/ wai/ navigation/
container.jsp> (last visited 14 Oct. 2013).
100
ELR November 2013 | No. 2
should have regard to other stakeholder groups (such as
communities and employees), but they must primarily
remain focused on the long-term interests of the compa-
ny and its shareholders. It would not be justified to
explicitly highlight particular interests, and it would
also establish a random order of priority of these inter-
ests.
b. Obligations to customers’ and other stakeholders’ interests
already exist and are sufficiently addressed by other legisla-
tion.
Directors already consider the interests and the implica-
tions of other stakeholders as part of their existing deci-
sion-making procedures while discharging their duties
as a good practice in systemically important financial
institutions. It is argued that directors have the overall
responsibility for the institution in any event and must
take decisions in the best interests of the company.
Except when a firm is approaching the zone of insolven-
cy, the primary duty of directors should be to the com-
pany and its shareholders. This responsibility includes
all stakeholders, and there is no value of singling out the
interests of one group in a prescriptive manner, as such
an obligation could potentially have the result of causing
a conflict of interest within the institution. The interests
of depositors and other creditors are protected by
enhanced capital requirements and tighter regulation on
risk management and deposit guarantee schemes as set
out in the Capital Requirements Directive.
c. The creation of a new duty could have negative effects in
practice.
A distinction should be made between a general respon-
sibility on directors to take into account wider stake-
holders in considering the interests of the company and
a specific duty of care to persons other than the compa-
ny itself and/or its shareholders. Changing the persons
to whom directors owe a duty could create considerable
difficulties and unintended consequences. There should
be caution to the effects of imposing a standardized
approach on financial institutions or deterrence of the
taking of risk. The creation of a new legal obligation
would be too general and have litigation consequences
that are difficult to measure. The implementation would
trigger many practical difficulties, the main one being
the prioritisation of duties. A second difficulty would be
to identify all existing and potential conflicts of interest
among stakeholders and to manage such conflicts of
interest. Directors then would have to conduct deeper
research prior to any decision.
d. There is no one-size-fits-all solution possible on a Euro-
pean level.
It depends on national corporate and financial law sys-
tems how and in what manner it would be achieved that
directors take the interests of depositors and other cred-
itors into account in their decision making, in addition
to shareholders’ interests.
A closer look at the above-mentioned drawbacks men-
tioned by the respondents reveals contradictory under-
standings. A few respondents focus on the practical dif-
ficulties that would arise with the implementation of
new duty of care towards stakeholders such as the defi-
nition and prioritisation of stakeholders’ interests while
others refuse to acknowledge the sheer possibility of
such a trade-off because the primary duty of directors is
thought to be to shareholders. However, there seems to
be a general agreement that directors should act in the
best interest of the financial institution.52 The following
responses by the Dutch government and the UK super-
visory bodies reveal that a legal duty to act in best inter-
ests of the company already exists in the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom but there is a difference in the
interpretation of the contents of this duty.
The Netherlands: Response from the Dutch govern-
ment
The Dutch government stated to be in favour of a gen-
eral duty of care in its response to the consultation by
explaining that this measure would be in line with the
existing concept of corporate governance in the Nether-
lands. The main principle behind this concept is that a
company is a long-term alliance between the various
parties involved in it. It was stated that directors already
have an overall responsibility for weighing up the inter-
ests of the various stakeholders in order to guarantee the
continuity of the company.53 Although the Dutch gov-
ernment did not mention the introduction of the Bank-
ing Code, this code also emphasizes a duty of due care
owed to clients by means of good practice in Dutch
banks.
The United Kingdom: Responses from the Financial
Reporting Council and Financial Services Authority
In the United Kingdom, the public authorities Financial
Reporting Council (FRC) and Financial Services
Authority (FSA) submitted a response to deliver a
standpoint from the governmental point of view regard-
ing the corporate governance system in the United
Kingdom.54 The governance debate in the United King-
dom is centred around the long-term view in the UK
Companies Act 2006, which requires directors to focus
on enlightened shareholder value. According to legal
requirements, directors are considered to be stewards of
shareholders’ interests while they are additionally
52. European Commission (2010). Feedback statement: Summary of
responses to Commission Green Paper on corporate governance in
financial institutions, Brussels: European Commission 2010, at 11.
53. Dutch Ministry of Finance (2010). Consultatiereactie Groenboek Cor-
porate Governance (Consultation Response to Green Paper on Corpo-
rate Governance), Kamerstukken II 2009-2010, 21 501-07, nr. 752
(attachment), at 2. This definition is similar to the one mentioned in the
Dutch Corporate Governance Code, Preamble, No. 7.
54. FRC (2010), Financial Reporting Council Response to the EU Commis-
sion’s Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions
and Remuneration Policies, 2010; FSA (2010), Financial Services
Authority (FSA) Response to Commission Green Paper: Corporate Gov-
ernance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration Policies, 31 August
2010.
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required to pay attention to the community, environ-
ment, employees and other standards relevant to the
success of the company.55 The FSA mentions that it
already imposes a requirement on the companies it reg-
ulates to pay due regard to the interests of customers
and treat them fairly.56 Yet directors are merely
accountable to shareholders if they do not comply with
the law. The accountability towards shareholders shall
not be applied to enforce directors to act for the success
of the company beyond shareholders’ interests, e.g. cus-
tomers’ interests. The FRC maintains that shareholder
control needs to be retained as shareholders deliver new
capital.57 It is also for this reason that the FRC disagrees
with the recommendation to impose a specific duty of
care towards other stakeholders.58 Another objection to
the duty is raised by the FSA stating that there should
be given careful thought as to who is included under the
heading of ‘other stakeholders’ before introducing this
requirement to directors. Furthermore, the FSA ques-
tions how directors are expected to resolve any conflicts
that arise in the interests of shareholders, customers and
‘other stakeholders’.59
In summary, the responses to the European consultation
for the creation of a sector-specific duty of care towards
clients’ interests in financial institutions are varied, and
there is no agreement on a European level because of
diverging domestic corporate governance systems. In
the Netherlands, a positive attitude towards such a duty
prevails because this measure is in line with the existing
concept of governance, where directors are required to
take a wide range of stakeholders’ interests into account
for the continuity of the company. Yet in the United
Kingdom, where directors may also take a range of
stakeholders’ interests into account, the primary respon-
sibility nonetheless seems to be towards shareholders’
interests in the end and therefore a specific duty with an
emphasis on clients’ interests is not favoured.
3.2 Post-crisis Developments: Shifting the Scope
Towards the Public Interest
3.2.1 Risk Management in the Banking Sector: Public
Costs and Public Benefits
When we view the significant position of banks in soci-
ety, some specific features60 can be noticed that set the
banking sector apart from other lines of business. Most-
ly, these specific features are connected with the fact
that commercial business activities of banks are signifi-
cantly engaged with risk management to guard the
impact on public costs and benefits. Failures in the gov-
ernance of banks lead to major public costs. The other
55. FRC (2010), above n. 54, at 2; Sec. 172 Companies Act 2006.
56. Principle 6, Business Principles, FSA Handbook, available online at:
<http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/PRIN/2/1> (last visited
14 Oct. 2013).
57. FRC (2010), above n. 54, at 3.
58. FRC (2010), above n. 54, at 5.
59. FSA (2010), above n. 54, at 6.
60. G. Ferrarini & M.C. Ungureanu, Unique Features in the Governance of
Bankers’ Compensation (2009), in Liber Amicorum in Honour of Theo
Raaijmakers, at 123.
side of the picture is the impact on public benefits by
viewing the societal function of banks to secure the pub-
lic good of financial stability. Looking at the public costs
and benefits, it becomes clear that the balance between
the costs that come with risk and the benefits that come
with returns has wide implications for the public inter-
est.
For banks, the far-reaching consequences of their
actions on the public interest bring along the duty to
deal in a prudent manner with the funds entrusted to
them even next to their existing legal and public obliga-
tions.61 Yet in the aftermath of the recent financial cri-
sis, it has often been argued that banks and other finan-
cial institutions have lost track of their social signifi-
cance during the past years. They are alleged to have
subordinated the interests of employees, customers and
society and the continuity of the enterprise to short-
term profits and shareholders’ interests.62 The business
decisions made by bank directors, which led to this sit-
uation, have played an important role in this matter. In
an earlier essay, I have stressed that the main peril of a
corporate environment where directors merely zoom in
on shareholders’ interests is that social values will be
neglected and swapped for sheer economic values.63
The following sub-paragraphs further examine the pub-
lic costs and public benefits of their business activities to
highlight the social context of banks.
3.2.2 Public Costs: Bailouts, Moral Hazard and
Excessive Risk-Taking
According to the free market discipline, companies with
poor results and poor (risk) management, which are
eventually confronted with fatal economic troubles, are
essentially forced to bear their losses and to settle with
the devastating consequences of a bankruptcy. As such,
the free market economy draws close analogies with the
Darwinian evolutionary concept of natural selection and
‘survival of the fittest’.64 The free market mechanism
prevents directors from taking excessive risks to the det-
riment of their company. Yet financial institutions may
nonetheless be prone to excessive levels of risk-taking by
their directors because of the creation of moral hazard as
a perverse by-product of government bailouts. As we
61. See, e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), Compliance
and the compliance function in banks, April 2005, at 7: ‘A bank should
hold itself to high standards when carrying on business, and at all times
strive to observe the spirit as well as the letter of the law. Failure to con-
sider the impact of its actions on its shareholders, customers, employees
and the markets may result in significant adverse publicity and reputa-
tional damage, even if no law has been broken’. See also Group of Thir-
ty (2012), n. 4 (arguing that a large concentration of power and social
externalities associated with the business of significant financial institu-
tions underscore the critical importance of good corporate governance
of such entities).
62. DNB (2009). De 7 Elementen van een Integere Cultuur: Beleidsvisie en
aanpak gedrag en cultuur bij financiële ondernemingen 2010-2014
(The 7 Elements of a Sound Culture: Policy Outlook and Tackling
Behavior and Culture at Financial Enterprises), November 2009.
63. W. Khan, (2011), Humanizing the law of business corporations for
good management practices, 3rd Global Peter Drucker Forum, Novem-
ber 2011, available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1992636> (last
visited 14 Oct. 2013).
64. J. Wright, The Ethics of Economic Rationalism (2003), at 124.
102
ELR November 2013 | No. 2
have witnessed during the recent financial crisis, bail-
outs to the financial sector in the form of government
interventions were provided by means of supplying
loans, giving capital injections, or purchasing assets of a
financial institution, or a group of financial institutions
facing severe financial difficulties or bankruptcy. Bail-
outs have a disruptive effect as they form an exception
to the free market rule65 and result in a form of subsi-
dized risk-taking where markets are not self-correcting.
The rationale behind bailouts mostly stems from the
problem of ‘too-big-to-fail’66 financial institutions.
When large financial institutions are confronted with
failure, there are huge risks of a domino effect of failures
being triggered in other companies doing business with
the failed institution. Bailouts are precautionary meas-
ures aimed at preventing the downfall of such vulnera-
ble financial institutions. Governments are not equip-
ped with a clear-cut rule they might apply in order to
decide when to step in and to intervene by means of
bailouts.67 In terms of economic efficiency, it is plausi-
ble that the government will come to the rescue when
the costs of non-intervention are estimated to be higher
than the decision to intervene but it is difficult to make
such a cost–benefits analysis. When too large institu-
tions fail and governments decide not to bail out, there
is the risk that the financial troubles will be dispersed on
an unforeseeable macro-level and that the national econ-
omy collapses as a whole. Moreover, the contagious
effects are not bound to geographical limits and could
spread to other countries thereby negatively affecting
international financial markets. Shareholders and a wide
range of other stakeholders are benefited if the company
remains to be a going concern, preventing a financial
meltdown and a massive increase in unemployment fig-
ures. Consequently, governments are forced to interfere
and to spend public funding to prevent the failure of
such too-big-to-fail financial institutions. Factually,
governments step up and take over the institutions’
responsibilities towards shareholders, employees and
creditors of the institution and the society as a whole. In
the political-economic discourse, it has been argued that
the bailouts in the recent financial crisis have contrib-
uted to the privatization of profits and the socialization
of losses.68
The creation of moral hazard by means of government
bailouts leads to perverse effects in risk management by
inducing directors of financial institutions to take undue
risks because the costs associated with those risks will
65. See, e.g., B. Ritholtz, Bailout Nation (2009), at 161 et seq.; G.H. Stern
& R.J. Feldman, Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts (2004);
K. Dowd, ‘Moral Hazard and the Financial Crisis’, 29 Cato Journal 1, at
141-166 (2009).
66. Synonyms used are (inter alia) ‘too interconnected to fail’, ‘too complex
to fail, ‘too important to fail’ and ‘too international to fail’.
67. See, e.g., V. McKinley & G. Gegenheimer (2009), Bright Lines and Bail-
outs: To Bail or Not To Bail, That Is the Question, Policy Analysis, No.
637.
68. E. Engelen, et al., After the Great Complacence: Financial Crisis and the
Politics of Reform (2011), at 32; N.N. Taleb, ‘Ten Principles for a Black
Swan-proof World’, Financial Times (2009), 7 April 2009; J.E. Stiglitz,
‘Obama’s Ersatz Capitalism’, New York Times, 31 March 2009.
not be directly borne by their companies. This implies
that financial institutions supported by government pro-
tection are less vulnerable for economic uncertainty and
may even seek to benefit from their preferential position
by taking excessive and immoral risks as they are aware
of their ability to rely on the implicitly guaranteed gov-
ernmental protection mechanism. Such a situation
incentivizes harmful risk-taking and provides too-big-
to-fail financial institutions with competitive advantages
over other players in financial markets. Several regulato-
ry measures have already been taken to curb the lack of
market discipline and to enhance the risk-management
framework of banks and other financial institutions. For
example, standards on capital adequacy have been tight-
ened with the implementation of Basel III69 in order to
strengthen the solvency of banks. This measure does not
directly affect the responsibility of directors in decision-
making procedures in order to eliminate the problem of
moral hazard but rather shifts the allocation of risk bur-
dens to shareholders by extending the liability of share-
holders with a greater amount of capital.
3.2.3 Public Benefits: Public Utility Function
When large business corporations become insolvent,
their assets can be sold or liquidated and other value-
creating business corporations may take their place in a
process Schumpeter has described as ‘creative destruc-
tion’.70 Yet financial institutions have a public utility
function – even though they are private actors and not
public institutions – because of their central role in
financial intermediation and capital allocation, and when
they take risks, they have to take the public interest into
account because of their systemic function in the econo-
my.71 The banking sector has a significant role in pro-
viding capital to companies and individuals serving the
needs of the society and the economy. The public utility
function of the banking sector becomes apparent when
taking into account that the public interest is at stake in
case failures occur at large banks as this may cause a
breakdown in economic activity72 and threaten the
financial stability as a whole.
In summary, banks are subject to different conditions
than ordinary business companies are because of the
major public costs and benefits they have to take into
account in their risk management. The recent financial
crisis has revealed this notion all the more. Because of
this distinct position, the need for a context-specific
approach for directors’ duties in the banking sector
69. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), Basel III: A global reg-
ulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems, Basel:
BIS 2010. Also available online at: <http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs189.pdf> (last visited 14 Oct. 2013).
70. J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (3rd ed.)
(1950).
71. See also A. Kaletsky, Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy in
the Aftermath of Crisis (2010), at 250: ‘Banks may be legally structured
as private companies, answerable only to their shareholders, but they
have a uniquely important social function and thus operate in the public
realm, with implicit government support.’
72. Such is also the case with other financial institutions, see V.V. Acharya,
et al., Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Debacle
of Mortgage Finance (2011), at 65.
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whereby the public interest is taken into account more
significantly is justifiable.
4 The Potential for Context-
Specific Directors’ Duties
and Enforcement
Mechanisms in the Banking
Sector
When evaluating the feasibility for context-specific
directors’ duties, it is essential to examine the potential
for such duties from the view of law, besides the need
and rationale for reforms. In this paragraph, the poten-
tial for context-specific directors’ duties in the banking
sector will be examined by viewing how courts may cre-
ate and apply doctrines to formulate the context-specific
contents of open-textured directors’ duties. In the con-
text of the banking sector, courts may develop context-
specific duties that require directors to take the public
interest into account. In order to accommodate an
increased accountability of directors’ duties towards the
public interest, there is a justified need for the introduc-
tion of public-enforcement mechanisms but the ques-
tion is whether the introduction of such enforcement
mechanisms is feasible.
4.1 Context versus Doctrine in the Creation of
Law
Corporate law systems have adopted open-textured
standards when it comes to directors’ duties in order to
deal with the question how to balance general standards
with individual circumstances73 in a just manner.74 In
practice, tensions arise when it comes to judicial review
of open-textured directors’ duties because these stan-
dards of conduct are caught in an interdependent rela-
tionship of context and doctrine.75 On the one hand,
there needs to be room for individual contextualism to
apply a circumstantial interpretation of the facts against
the background of an open-textured formulation.
73. ‘General propositions do not decide concrete cases.’ Lochner v. New
York (1905) 198 US 45 (O.W. Holmes, Jr.’s diss. opinion).
74. More in general, all legal systems are concerned with the question how
to find a balance between doctrine and contextualism by means of rules
and standards, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd ed.) (2012), at
130: ‘In fact all systems, in different ways, compromise between two
social needs: the need for certain rules which can cover great areas of
conduct, safely be applied by private individuals to themselves without
fresh official guidance or weighing up of social issues, and the need to
leave open, for later settlement by an informed, official choice, issues
which can only be properly appreciated and settled when they arise in a
concrete case.’
75. Assink identifies this tension in matters of director liability (Sec. 2:9
Dutch Civil Code) and calls for increased doctrinal conceptualization to
create ‘a more balanced interplay between contextualism and doctrinal
conceptualization’, see B.F. Assink, ‘Internal and External Director Liabil-
ity in Dutch Corporate (Case) Law – Towards a More Balanced Interplay
Between Contextualism and Doctrinal Conceptualization (or simply:
Why Doctrine Matters, Besides Context)’, in Corporate Bona Fides in
Corporate and Securities Law (2013) (forthcoming).
Courts recognize that directors may have to act and
decide differently from one context to another in order
to fulfil their directors’ duties. On the other hand, any
judicial interpretation of directors’ duties should occur
against the background of an organised bulk of relevant
previous jurisprudence. Context allows change whereas
doctrine provides continuity. It is difficult to find a
refined balance in the delicate duel between these two
significant law-making concepts. With the desirability
of a solid evolution of corporate law – and more specific
a consistent future evolution of directors’ duties – in
mind, it is readily agreeable to steer towards calls for an
increased doctrinal approach of such contexts to be
developed by courts with the argument that ‘it must not
just be about fact, but also about a balanced system with
a coherent rationale’.76
If we incorporate the concept of an increased doctrinal
approach to the realm of open-textured directors’
duties, this would imply that individual context-sensi-
tive cases should be framed to a judicially developed
doctrine behind a recurring set of circumstances. Rele-
vant recurring sets of circumstances might include cer-
tain characteristics of the company – e.g. the size, type
and form of the company – or certain conditions – e.g.
flotations, mergers, takeovers or insolvency as part of
the company’s lifecycle – in which the company is situ-
ated. In the United States, such an approach already
exists to certain extent where Delaware – a favoured
state for incorporation of companies serving as a ‘legal
home’ for many business entities – courts have devel-
oped adverse spectrum of doctrinal categories in juris-
prudence representing a context-specific application of
existing traditional fiduciary duties emphasizing that in
specific contexts directors must consistently discharge
their duties with a specific corporate objective while
serving specific interests.77 For example, Delaware
courts have articulated context-specific doctrines
regarding directors’ duties in the contexts of the sale of a
76. Assink (2013), above n. 75.
77. Sitkoff defines such context-specific duties as ‘subsidiary or implement-
ing rules’ mentioning that ‘the experience with recurring, common sets
of facts and circumstances has led to the development of subsidiary or
implementing rules regarding the application of the duties of loyalty or
care to those circumstances’, see R.H. Sitkoff, ‘The Economic Structure
of Fiduciary Law’, 91 Bost. U. L. Rev., at 1039, 1044 (2011). I prefer
not to use the term ‘rules’ in the narrow sense of well-delineated legal
norms in this matter because these context-specific doctrines are still
based on general evolving precepts and do not provide a clear-cut blue-
print.
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company78 and insolvency.79 In this article, I exemplify
the notion of context-specific doctrines with an analysis
of the type of company as a specific context by focusing
on the banking sector.
4.2 The Judicial Emergence of Context-Specific
Directors’ Duties
4.2.1 The United States
In common law jurisdictions, judges have been endowed
with discretionary powers to apply the mechanism of
equity for the interpretation of directors’ duties to the
circumstances of the case. In the United States, it seems
that courts have embraced this possibility to elaborate
on the formulation of duties in the case of bank direc-
tors. Here, banks and insurance companies were the
first publicly held corporations80 and it has long been
recognized in jurisprudence that the directors of banks
have the duty of exercising a higher degree of care and
skill than do directors of ordinary companies.81 Nearly a
century ago, courts decided directors of a manufactur-
ing company were not expected to have the knowledge
of a specialist as they are general advisers of the busi-
ness82 while bank directors on the other hand seemed to
be required to possess a certain degree of expertise.83
Even before, as early as 1901, the Indiana court in the
United States ruled that bank directors have a primary
duty to understand the financial condition of the bank.84
The court mentioned that this duty was owed to the
shareholders, depositors and other creditors and the
public. In the US federal banking regulation, federally
insured depository institutions are claimed to be under a
direct fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the
federal banking agencies while these agencies are viewed
as guardians of federal deposit insurance funds protect-
ing the public interest.85 The condition of ‘unsafe or
unsound banking practices’ serves as a trigger for direc-
tor liability arguably creating a higher standard of care
78. In this context, the corporate objective for directors changes to short-
term value maximization for shareholders instead of taking the long run
into account, see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) and Wayne Cty. Empls.’ Ret. Sys. v. Corti,
2009 WL 2219260, at *10 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009): ‘So-called Revlon
duties are only a specific application of directors’ traditional fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty in the context of control transactions.’
79. Delaware courts have developed the so-called ‘insolvency exception’
articulating that the fiduciary duties of directors shift from shareholders
to creditors in insolvent companies, see North American Catholic Edu-
cational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92
(Del. 2007). See alsoIn re Hechinger Investment Co. of Delaware, 274
B.R. 71 (D. Del. 2002); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d
784 (Del. Ch. 1992); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Com-
munications Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991).
80. D.T. Mitchell, ‘Status Bound: The Twentieth Century Evolution of Direc-
tors’ Liability’, 5 NYU Journal of Law and Business 63, at 71 (2009).
81. Greenfield Savings Bank v. Abercrombie, 211 Mass. 252, 255, 97 N.E.
897, 899 (1912).
82. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 Fed. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
83. Williams v. McKay, 46 N. J. Eq. 25, 56, 18 A. 824 (1889); Campbell v.
Watson, 62 N. J. Eq. 392, 409, 50 A. 120 (1901); Warren v. Robinson,
19 Utah 289, 59 P. 287 (1899).
84. Coddington v. Conaday, 157 Ind. 243, 61 N.E. 567 (1901).
85. L.G. Baxter, ‘Fiduciary Issues in Federal Banking Regulation’, 56 Law
and Contemporary Problems 1, at 7 (1993).
for bank directors than that imposed by the common
law fiduciary duty of care.86 It is debatable whether the
aforementioned cases provide more clarification, but
courts have indeed recognized the specific character of
banks on a consistent basis leading to a distinct interpre-
tation of the contents of directors’ duties to be applied
in the context of banks in which the public interest
seems to be recognized.87
4.2.2 The Netherlands
Most civil law jurisdictions have codified open-textured
directors’ duties of a non-fiduciary nature, which also
provide judicial discretion for such a contextualized
approach towards banks and other financial institutions.
Yet, whereas courts in common law jurisdictions contin-
uously might more readily embroider on an evolving
body of jurisprudence on the basis of doctrinal prece-
dent, courts in civil law countries mostly seem to apply a
case-by-case approach whereby the open texture of stat-
utory directors’ duties is applied to the circumstances of
individual cases and it seems more difficult for judges to
come up with solid legal doctrines in such a system.
This may limit the possibility to come up with a more
consistent judge-made legal framework for context-spe-
cific directors’ duties in order to set a precedent to be
used in future cases. In the context of banks, the Dutch
Supreme Court has ruled that banks have a duty of a
care towards clients’ interests mentioning that ‘the
social function of the bank involves a special duty of
care, towards clients on account of their existent con-
tractual relationship as well as towards third parties
whose interests they ought to take into account accord-
ing to what befits unwritten law in society. The scope of
this duty of care depends on the circumstances of the
case.’88 Yet courts did not elaborate on specific duties of
directors in such specific contexts. In a recent judgment
of the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of
Appeal regarding the Fortis bank, the court finally
seemed to acknowledge that the specific context of cer-
tain financial institutions may shift the scope of direc-
tors’ duties.
86. H.M. Schooner, ‘Fiduciary Duties’ Demanding Cousin: Bank Director
Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices’, 63 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 175 (1995). See also R.B. Adams, ‘Governance and the Financial
Crisis’, ECGI – Finance Working Paper No. 248/2009(2009), available
at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1398583> (last visited 14 Oct.
2013) (arguing that regulators expect boards to act to ensure the safety
and soundness of the financial institution and this is an objective that
may not necessarily be in the best interest of shareholders).
87. See also S.M. Bainbridge (2013), The Fiduciary Duties of Bank Direc-
tors, 21 March 2013, available at: <http:// www .professorbainbridge
.com/professorbainbridgecom/2013/03/the-fiduciary-duties-of-bank-
directors.html> (last visited 14 Oct. 2013) (arguing that there is indeed
precedent to prove that the fiduciary duties of bank directors differ
from the duties for ordinary corporate directors as bank directors are
required to not merely consider shareholders’ interests but then con-
cluding on the contrary that this is not how the law ought to be as
directors cannot serve two masters simultaneously and cannot have
such ‘multi-fiduciary’ duties).
88. Dutch Supreme Court 9 January 1998, NJ 1999, 285 (Mees Pierson/
Ten Bos), Dutch Supreme Court 23 December 2005, NJ 2006, 289
(Safe Haven).
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In the Fortis case,89 the court reaffirmed the general
duty of directors to act in the interests of the company
and its affiliated enterprise and to take the interests of
all stakeholders involved into account.90 The court fur-
ther explained that the interests involved in this case did
not only include shareholders’ interests but also the
interests of various clients, such as depositors.91 Fur-
thermore, the court mentioned that the discretionary
powers of directors in the management of risks are
influenced by the nature of the company and the extent
to which various stakeholders and – in some cases – the
society as a whole have an interest in the results of its
risk management.92 In this case, it was decided that due
to the nature of the company – a bank – and the inter-
ests of those involved, directors were subject to a special
duty of care regarding matters of risk management.93
The court also noted that the bank’s duty of care is
sharpened by the fact that banks in particular are
dependent on the trust that clients, other (system)
banks, shareholders and the public in general hold in
them and undermining that essential trust would entail
major and immediate risks for the functioning and thus
the continuity of the bank.94 The court goes on further
to mention that the Fortis bank was a system bank with
a utility function in Dutch finance and economics due to
the magnitude of its operations.95 The possibility that
such a bank cannot fulfil its role properly under certain
circumstances and the threatening downfall of such a
bank carry along the risk of severe damage to the finan-
cial and economic system, according to the court.96
Interestingly, the court mentions this implies that direc-
tors should also have taken into account the general
public interest which depended upon the continuity of
system bank Fortis.97 As yet, the case has not been
brought to the Supreme Court.
This case sets forward a context-specific directors’ duty
to act in the interest of the company. The duty is exten-
ded to the public interest (beneficiary) involved with the
continuity (corporate objective) of Fortis as a system
bank. The court has recognized the public utility func-
tion of system banks. Traditionally, the government has
the duty to protect the public interest. In this case, it is
rather interesting to notice that the court has acknowl-
edged that this traditional governmental role is extended
to the responsibilities of directors. Directors’ duties may
shift towards the public interest in the context of a sys-
tem bank because of the impact of its risks and activities
on the public interest.
Although this is the first case where such context-spe-
cific directors’ duties are mentioned for system banks, a
89. Enterprise Chamber Amsterdam Court of Appeal, 5 April 2012 (para.






95. Enterprise Chamber Amsterdam Court of Appeal, 5 April 2012 (para.
4.4), ARO 2012, 54 (VEB/Fortis).
96. Id.
97. Id.
doctrinal precedent may be laid for future cases if the
Supreme Court upholds the decision of the Enterprise
Chamber and the outcomes of this case and decides to
abandon the case-by-case approach in order to apply
this interpretation consistently in future cases. Admit-
tedly, it may be a weak premise to predict a future trend
of context-specific doctrines on the basis of one case,
but taken together with the aforementioned post-crisis
developments in the banking sector, this case exempli-
fies the potential to create context-specific directors’
duties for the banking sector and it may very well be
seen as a starting point. It must be noted that the further
judicial development of such a context-specific doctrine
may require many years, if not decades or perhaps
another financial crisis, because courts are dependent on
similarly relevant cases to be brought before them in
order to elaborate on a doctrinal basis.
4.3 The Proposal for a Legislative Emergence of
Context-Specific Directors’ Duties in the
United Kingdom
Besides the judicial development of context-specific
directors’ duties, legislators are also able to take initia-
tive to create of context-specific directors’ duties in the
banking sector. Recently, the UK Parliamentary Com-
mission on Banking Standards emphasized the impor-
tance of personal responsibility of bank directors.98 It is
argued that bank directors should be held responsible
for the safety and soundness of their banks. The Com-
mission acknowledged that the obligations of directors
to shareholders in accordance with the provisions of the
Companies Act 2006 create a particular tension between
duties to shareholders and financial safety and sound-
ness in the case of banks.99 In order to resolve this ten-
sion, the Commission recommended a government con-
sultation for a proposal on amending Section 172 Com-
panies Act regarding the directors’ duty to act for the
success of the company in the case of banks, in order to
require bank directors to prioritise the financial safety
and soundness of the bank over shareholders’
interests.100 Furthermore, the Commission also recom-
mended amendments to the UK Corporate Governance
Code and the PRA Principles for Businesses to reflect
that bank directors are required to operate in accordance
with the safety and soundness of the firm and that they
need to interpret their duties in the light of this require-
ment.101 This standard of conduct would be somewhat
similar to the one for directors of federally insured
banks in the United States102 although it must be men-
tioned that the US standard is also accompanied with an
enforcement mechanism attributed to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation to institute civil law
98. House of Commons (2013), Changing banking for good: Report of the
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, volume 1: Summary,
and Conclusions, and recommendations, HC 175-1, June 2013.
99. Id., at 41.
100. Id., at 42.
101. Id., at 41-42.
102. See para. 4.2.1.
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suits against former directors and officers of failed banks
on the basis of detailed investigations.
5 The Potential for Public
Enforcement of Context-
Specific Directors’ Duties
Enforcement mechanisms related to directors’ duties
provide an essential disincentive for directors to breach
their duties because it makes them acutely aware that
they may be held accountable. Therefore, if we want to
take the potential of context-specific directors’ duties in
the banking sector a step further, an important subse-
quent question we need to think about is how such con-
text-specific directors’ duties for the benefit of the pub-
lic interest may actually be enforced. Currently, the only
deterrent to directors’ misconduct in relation to their
duties is the fear of civil liability. A breach of directors’
duties gives rise to civil liability through private
enforcement, but this mechanism is not primarily inten-
ded to protect the public interest.103 As such, existing
sanctions from civil proceedings may not suffice to be
effective for the enforcement of context-specific direc-
tors’ duties towards the public interest. In the context of
insolvency, civil enforcement actions are commonly
brought by the liquidators of the company who may act
not only in the creditors’ interests but also in the public
interest. Yet this mechanism does not protect the public
interest outside the context of insolvency. Overall, this
results in a lack of powers to take action against bank
directors who fail to protect the public interest and
intentionally act to the detriment of the company in
breach of their context-specific duties.104
Because of the social context of banks and other finan-
cial institutions and the public interest involved as rec-
ognized by courts, it is defensible to view whether the
accountability of directors regarding the above-men-
tioned context-specific directors’ duties in the banking
sector can be increased by means of public-enforcement
powers. As yet, directors may be subject to secondary
liability for a breach of criminal law and be confronted
with criminal sanctions when an offence is committed
by a company105 but there are no public-enforcement
mechanisms to hold directors accountable for intention-
al breach of directors’ duties in the public interest. In
line with this need for public enforcement, recent devel-
opments in foreign jurisdictions have urged on the eval-
uation of a potential implementation of public-enforce-
103. This is also the case in the United Kingdom, see A. Keay (2013), The
Public Enforcement of Directors’ Duties, available at SSRN: <http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2201598> (last visited 14 Oct. 2013).
104. In the United States, a similar question on how to enforce a duty to
promote the public interest in corporations has arisen even outside the
context of banks with the recent introduction of ‘(public) benefit corpo-
rations’ – profit-seeking corporations that affirmatively promote the
public interest –in several states.
105. Sec. 51, para. 2, Dutch Penal Code.
ment mechanisms by means of increasing the role of
criminal law.
5.1 Recent Developments in Foreign
Jurisdictions
In New Zealand, proposals for a major company and
securities law reform in the aftermath of the financial
crisis include the suggestion to make ‘the most egre-
gious breaches of directors’ duties be subject to criminal
liability, and be publicly enforceable by the Financial
Markets Authority and the Registrar of Companies’.106
The proposal aims to amend the Companies Act.
According to the newly to be inserted section 138A in
the Companies Act:
A director of a company commits an offence if the
director exercises powers or performs duties as a
director of the company, or omits to exercise powers
or perform duties as a director of the company, –
(a) in bad faith towards the company; and
(b) believing the conduct is not in the best interests of
the company; and
(c) knowing, or being reckless as to whether, the con-
duct will cause –
(i) serious loss to the company; or
(ii) benefit or advantage to a person who is not the
company (including, for example, to the director).
However, directors will have a defence – according to
the newly to be inserted section 138B of the Companies
Act – if the director proves in relation to the company
concerned, that the company’s shareholders had given
prior agreement to the relevant conduct, with the belief
that the conduct was in the best interests of the compa-
ny’s holding company or a joint venture between its
shareholders, provided that the company’s constitution
expressly permits directors to act in the best interests of
the holding company or shareholders.
There is support for the idea of public enforcement con-
sidering the potential for substantial harm to the public
interest when directors of companies in the financial
sector intentionally and dishonestly breach their
duties107 but this proposal is also inevitably highly con-
106. Office of the Minister of Commerce Cabinet Paper to the Chair of the
Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee: Securities
Law Reform (February 2011), available at: <http://www.med.govt.nz/
business/business-law/pdf-docs-library/current-business-law-work/
securities-law-review/review-of-securities-law-cabinet-paper-
feb-2011483-kb-pdf.pdf> (last visited 14 Oct. 2013).
107. Office of the Minister of Commerce Cabinet Paper to the Chair of the
Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee: Securities
Law Reform (February 2011), at 43. The reforms in New Zealand are
also in line with the existing Sec. 184 Corporations Act in Australia. In
this legal provision, it is articulated that directors commit a criminal
offence when they are – inter alia – reckless or intentionally dishonest,
and fail to exercise their powers and discharge their duties in good faith
in the best interests of the corporation or for a proper purpose.
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troversial because it would raise liability concerns for
directors.108
Recently, developments have also been taking place in
the United Kingdom, where the government is current-
ly considering the possibility of introducing criminal
sanctions for serious misconduct by directors in the
management of a bank.109 The UK government is inves-
tigating which kind of managerial misconduct by direc-
tors of failed banks could be subjected to criminal sanc-
tions, looking at four possibilities: (i) being a director at
the relevant time of a failed bank (implying strict liabili-
ty); (ii) negligence; (iii) incompetence; (iv) recklessness.
This proposal would be a first step in providing public-
enforcement mechanisms when directors breach their
directors’ duty to act for the success of the company,
apart from fraud and other criminal offences such as
insider dealing and making misleading statements.
These proposals for reform would have major implica-
tions for directors, shareholders and the public. Taking
the discussions regarding the proposals into account,
various arguments pro and con the introduction of pub-
lic-enforcement mechanisms come to the forefront.110
5.2 Justifying Public-Enforcement Mechanisms
While some banks may be considered ‘too big to fail’,
they should not perceived to be ‘too big to sanction’ by
their directors. A lack of directors’ accountability to the
public might decrease the public confidence in banks,
especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Public-
enforcement mechanisms bring along a fear for the stig-
ma associated with criminal sanctions and reputational
sanctions, which would deter directors from breaching
the directors’ duty to act in the interest of the company.
This would imply a preventive effect as these mecha-
nisms shape social norms and morals.
The need for public-enforcement mechanisms may be
explained by the fact that directors currently are not
always confronted with legal accountability through pri-
vate-enforcement mechanisms when they breach their
duty to act in the interest of the company. There may be
disincentives for the company to engage in civil pro-
ceedings against directors when the costs are weighed
against the benefits.111
108. For a very critical response from a US law professor to the develop-
ments regarding the criminalisation of directors’ duties in New Zealand,
see S.M. Bainbridge, Really Criminalizing Agency Costs, 19 October
2011, available at: <http:// www .professorbainbridge .com/
professorbainbridgecom/ 2011/ 10/ really -criminalizing -agency -costs
.html> (last visited 14 Oct. 2013) (arguing ‘this strikes me as literally
insane’).
109. HM Treasury (2012), Sanctions for the directors of failed banks, July
2012, available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/ attachment_ data/ file/ 81565/ consult_ sanctions_ directors_
banks.pdf> (last visited 14 Oct. 2013).
110. For an extensive review of the various arguments in reaction to the pro-
posals in New Zealand, see S. Watson & R. Hirsch, ‘Empty Heads, Pure
Hearts: The Unintended Consequences of the Criminalisation of Direc-
tors’ Duties’, 17 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 97 (2011).
111. Office of the Minister of Commerce Cabinet Paper to the Chair of the
Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee: Securities
Law Reform (February 2011), at 43. For other obstacles for the compa-
ny to take action, see Keay (2013), at 7-8.
Besides the company, shareholders might hold directors
accountable if they would have access to legal proceed-
ings by means of a derivative action, but even so share-
holders may lack an incentive to enforce the public
interest. Shareholders’ interests and the public interest
are not always reconcilable. It is not to be expected of
shareholders that they would hold bank directors
accountable in the situation that not taking the public
interest into account would amount to a breach of the
directors’ duty to act in the interest of the company. As
such, public enforcement may also be needed to protect
the public interest when shareholders are ill-equipped
to hold bank directors accountable.
In addition, other stakeholders do not have access to
private-enforcement mechanisms to hold directors
accountable. Instead of having to rely on private-
enforcement mechanisms, public-enforcement mecha-
nisms provide a solution for proactive law enforcement
when there is no party to initiate legal proceedings.
With the lack of public-enforcement mechanisms, the
public interest would be inadequately protected against
the harm it may suffer from the breach of a bank direc-
tors’ duty to act in the interest of the company in such
cases.
5.3 Obstacles to the Introduction of Public-
Enforcement Mechanisms
The introduction of public-enforcement mechanisms by
means of the criminalisation of directors’ duties can be
considered an intrusive method to influence behaviour.
It may even be called a draconian measure as there is a
serious risk of exposing honest directors to uncertainty
and liability as an unintended consequence. First, it
would be necessary to identify clearly which directors
have been in breach of their directors’ duty to act in the
interest of the company. There has to be established
causation. This is a difficult and problematic task as it
may not be clear which business decisions by which
directors can be attributed to have led to an alleged
breach of the directors’ duty. Viewing the matter fur-
ther from the directors’ point of view, there would also
have to be met a high threshold before action is possi-
ble112 in order to prevent that directors are chilled from
taking entrepreneurial risks113 by imposing a too
demanding standard of liability.
In the Netherlands, the current ambiguity regarding the
directors’ duty to act in the interest of the company also
makes the introduction of a public-enforcement mecha-
nism practically impossible if courts do not first provide
more clarification about its scope and interpretation on a
consistent doctrinal basis. Courts are hardly able to
review director behaviour, which is based on an indefi-
nite legal standard of conduct. The judiciary needs to
provide a meaning of this standard of conduct on a doc-
trinal basis in the first place. A starting point has already
been provided by the Enterprise Chamber in the afore-
112. Office of the Minister of Commerce Cabinet Paper to the Chair of the
Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee: Securities
Law Reform (February 2011), at 6.
113. Id., at 43.
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mentioned Fortis case when it comes to system banks,
which leads to the potential to develop context-specific
bank directors’ duties.114 The legislator could also play
an important role in this matter when looking at the
aforementioned proposals in the United Kingdom for a
legislative emergence of context-specific directors’
duties in the banking sector.115
Furthermore, it may well be that a breach of the direc-
tors’ duty to act in the interest of the company shows an
overlap with some form of fraudulent conduct that is
already penalized with criminal sanctions in existent leg-
islation.
High enforcement costs are another objection to the
introduction of public-enforcement mechanisms. Any
investigation or prosecution would be complex, time-
consuming and expensive116 and therefore might only
be applied in the most serious cases where great harm is
done to the public interest.117 Clear-cut parameters
should be set to decide whether or not to pursue a crim-
inal case. One should prevent a ‘corporate crime lot-
tery’118 in which cases might be more likely brought
against unpopular directors of failing banks to satisfy
public outcries.
Public-enforcement mechanisms may also transform
shareholders into disengaged ‘free riders’ as there is a
risk that shareholders become more passive in monitor-
ing the business decisions of directors and in holding
directors accountable. Shareholders might assume that
their interests are sufficiently taken into account by
external parties by means of public-enforcement mecha-
nisms.119
Finally, the public should remain to be cautious and
evaluate whether the proposed reforms to introduce
public-enforcement mechanisms by means of criminal
sanctions would be truly effective and problem solving.
The public needs to assess whether such reforms are
adequate enough to deal with the complexities discussed
above and if they are not arbitrary and merely intro-
duced in great haste driven by a political agenda or
media pressure.
In sum, the lack of private-enforcement mechanisms to
protect the public interest results in a gap that may be
filled by the introduction of public-enforcement mecha-
nisms. Public-enforcement mechanisms are a justifiable
instrument to enforce context-specific duties in the
banking sector because of an increased accountability of
directors towards the public interest. Yet from the
aforementioned obstacles, it has become clear that there
are various major objections in practice that need to be
overcome first before we can actually implement such
measures in the near future.
114. See para. 4.2.2.
115. See para. 4.3.
116. HM Treasury (2012), at 13.
117. G.J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws (1974), at 55-67, 56,
in G.S. Becker & W.M. Landes (eds.), Essays in the Economics of Crime
and Punishment, NBER (mentioning the cost limitations upon the
enforcement of laws).
118. L.E. Ribstein, ‘Agents Prosecuting Agents’, 7 J. L. Econ. & Pol’y 617
(2011), at 632.
119. Keay (2013), above n. 103, at 26.
6 Conclusion
The recent global financial crisis has challenged the sta-
tus quo providing new opportunities to dive into a
debate on reforms in the corporate governance system of
the banking sector. A fruitful part of this debate may be
to generate new thoughts on context-specific standards
of conduct for bank directors, which may require judi-
cial and legislative action. In the Netherlands, the statu-
tory general directors’ duty to act in the interest of the
company and its affiliated enterprise requires directors
to act in the interests of various corporate stakeholders
involved with the pursuit of a corporate objective. Yet
one of the most vented criticisms against the focus of
general directors’ duties towards a wide range of stake-
holders’ interests is that directors do not have a single
metric to aim at in the pursuit of their objective and that
they will eventually not be accountable to any stakehold-
er.120 This critique is inadequate. Due to their open-tex-
tured nature, current directors’ duties are a relative con-
cept transcending a rigid and one-size-fits-all approach
in various circumstances. Context-specific duties on a
doctrinal basis can provide more adequate guidance on
how directors may deal with conflicting stakeholders’
interests, by restricting directors’ actions to the key
stakeholders of the corporate objective to be pursued in
the given context. For directors of banks, the introduc-
tion -specific duty for the banking sector would allow
for an approach tailored to the context of an individual
business industry recognizing the specific characteristics
of the company. The questions we need to consider is
whether there is a need, rationale and potential for such
context-specific directors’ duties in the banking sector.
In recent post-crisis calls for reform in the Netherlands,
there has been an increasing awareness of a more explic-
it inclusion of clients’ interests in bank directors’ duties
through the Banking Code. Foreign jurisdictions such
as the United Kingdom seem to be more hesitant to
emphasize clients’ interests as they recognize a primary
responsibility to shareholders. Next to clients’ interests,
there seems to be a justified need to expand directors’
duties in the banking sector towards the public interest
when looking at post-crisis developments because of the
major public costs and benefits of the business risks and
activities of financial institutions. Expansion of direc-
tors’ duties towards the public interest is a legal mecha-
nism to create disincentives for the negative externalisa-
tion of public risks in corporate decision-making proce-
dures by directors in the banking sector.
Besides the need and rationale, there is also a potential
for context-specific duties when taking the judicial
emergence and the UK proposal for a legislative emer-
gence of context-specific directors’ duties for the bank-
ing sector into account. The enhancement of the
accountability of directors for such context-specific
directors’ duties geared towards the public interest pro-
120. M.C. Jensen, ‘Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corpo-
rate Objective Function’, 14 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 3, at
8-21 (2001).
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vides a justified reason to introduce accommodating
public-enforcement mechanisms. However, looking at
the various arguments pro and con public-enforcement
mechanisms, there are still many obstacles and it
remains to be highly questionable whether such public-
enforcement mechanisms can actually be implemented
any time soon in the Dutch corporate law system.
Unfortunately, the bitter implication of all this is that
the introduction of context-specific directors’ duties in
the banking sector may as yet entail nothing more than
wishful thinking as it will merely end in toothless ambi-
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